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 Professor of Law, Kent Law School, University of Canterbury, UK. This is one part of a 
larger comparative study ÒThe New Poor PersonÕs Bankruptcy: A Qualitative Comparative 
StudyÓ.  Thanks to Laura Binger for research assistance, and to Joe Spooner and Toni 
Williams for comments. This chapter is based on the paper delivered at the Festschrift  for 
Jay Westbrook at the University of Texas, February 2, 2018. Among JayÕs many 
accomplishments was his pioneering work in promoting the comparative study of consumer 
bankruptcy in the late 1990s and his enthusiastic encouragement of younger scholars in this 
field.  His empirical research with Elizabeth Warren and Teresa Sullivan provided the 
starting point for  European research on individual bankruptcy. My empirical studies in 
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Ò The U.S. CodeÕs days as a paragon may be waning. One particular trend of note is 
the development of special regimes for low-income, no-asset filings, such as the 
U.K.Õs debt relief order.Ó1 
 
1.! Introduction           
Many over-indebted individuals have few assets, no repayment capacity,  and may 
be unable to afford access to bankruptcy in those jurisdictions which require 
individuals to pay for access.2  These are  the ÔNo Income: No AssetÕ debtors or ÔLow 
Income, Low Asset DebtorsÕ3. The World Bank  identifies the treatment of this group 
as a pressing international policy problem4  and the IMF has recommended the 
introduction of simplified  procedures for this group in its structural adjustment work 
                                                      
1  E Warren, J  Westbrook, K Porter, J Pottow, The Law of Debtors and Creditors, Text, 
Cases and Problems (7th ed) 320.  
2 See  e.g. R Mann, ÔMaking Sense of Nation-Level Bankruptcy Filing RatesÕ in J Niemi, I 
Ramsay & W Whitford (eds) Consumer Credit Debt and Bankruptcy; Comparative and 
International Perspectives (Oxford, Hart, 2009) 243-44. German studies  suggest that 
perhaps  80 percent of  individual bankrupts  are nullinsolvenz (J Heuer, 2016),  incapable of 
making any payments under the six-year waiting period for discharge, while In Sweden 
approximately 40 percent of debtors on five-year restructuring plans have no repayment 
capacity but must wait for five years for a discharge I Ramsay, Personal Insolvency in the 
21st Century; A Comparison of the US and Europe  ch 5. For  Canada see S  Ben-Ishai and 
S Schwartz ÔBankruptcy for the Poor? (2007) 45(3) Osgoode Hall LJ 471. A recent 
Australian study identifies a group of  low income individuals  who have lost employment for 
whom bankruptcy may not provide a fresh start.  See P Ali, L O' Brien & I (Ian) Ramsay, 
'Bankruptcy and Debtor Rehabilitation: An Australian Empirical Study' (2017) 40 Melbourne 
L Rev. 688, 712-716, 733-734. In France, about 45 percent of individuals processed by the 
Overindebtedness Commissions are channelled to  rtablissement personnel  since they 
have no repayment capacity or assets. See Banque de France, Enqute typologique 2017 
sur le surendettement des mnages <https://particuliers.banque-france.fr/enquete-
typologique-2017-sur-le-surendettement-des-menages> 
3 Policy makers sometimes refer to the NINA debtor. Ronald Mann suggests that this should 
be extended to include Ôthose who have no substantial income or assets.Õ Mann, n2 (fn82). 
4  See World Bank, Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons (J  Kilborn, 
C Booth, J Niemi, I Ramsay and J Garrido, 2013) para 439 ÒOne of the most pressing 
problems is the treatment of debtors who cannot generate significant disposable income for 
the duration of the planÉSignificant numbers of debtors in all insolvency systems for natural 
persons fall into this category.Õ 
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in Europe.5  Bankruptcy simplification is also a significant policy issue in the US 
where bankruptcy costs have increased substantially since the enactment of the 
BAPCPA in 2005. Ronald Mann and Katherine Porter propose a 'streamlined 
administrative proceeding with low fees for access' for those people 'in irretrievable 
distress'. The process would  be  'a simple one-page form that debtors could 
complete without an attorney's assistance', in which public expenses 'are focused on 
vigilant efforts to detect and punish fraud'.6  
       The  Ôglobal proliferationÕ7 of  individual  bankruptcy systems throughout the 
world during recent decades raises the important question of the appropriate  
institutional framework  which will minimize  overall social costs, and retain public 
confidence.8 Individual bankruptcy cases are not a high stakes game and  NINA 
debtors represent a significant percentage of debtors. At the same time, individual 
bankruptcy may raise legal, budgeting and social issues that are not always simple. 
The choice of institutional structure raises issues of public administration and 
governance and the balance of public and private actors. The World Bank suggest 
                                                      
5 See e.g. Cyprus, discussed in Ramsay above n2 at 168.   
6  See K Porter & R Mann, 'Saving Up for Bankruptcy' (2010) 98 Geo LJ 289,338. And see R 
Mann, ÔMaking Sense of Nation-Level Bankruptcy Filing RatesÕ in J Niemi, I Ramsay & W 
Whitford,  (eds) Consumer Credit, Debt and Bankruptcy: Comparative and International 
Perspectives (Oxford, Hart, 2009) 243-244, 'The evidence points to bankruptcy 
simplification. The time has come to abandon the complicated structures laden with 
bureaucratic hurdlesÉAt least for the desperately insolvent, with no substantial income or 
assets, the best process is one that is stripped down to its most central elementsÉthe 
system should function as an administrative process designed to provide a service at the 
lowest possible transaction costÉthe system should provide complete and unconditional 
relief as quickly as practicable. This should occur within days or weeks after the 
filingÉFinally the system should impose stern criminal sanctions for fraudÉA simple and 
expedient process will collapse if it is tainted by fraud.'   
         Angela Littwin in discussing the impact of BAPCPA on bankruptcy costs notes: ÔTo 
make matters worse, clients who had particularly low incomes, were elderly, spoke little 
English or were otherwise not technologically savvy required additional resources to 
shepherd them through post-BAPCPA bankruptcy. This is a particular problem because 
disadvantaged clients are less able to afford these costs than others, and most of the 
attorneys who discussed this issue appeared to serve mainly this type of client.Õ A Littwin, 
ÔAdapting to BAPCPAÕ (2016) 90 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 183, 223. See also A 
Littwin, ÔThe Affordability Paradox: How Consumer BankruptcyÕs Greatest Weakness May 









that institutional frameworks represent a continuum ranging from  the situation where 
an administrative agency dominates the process  to court-based systems serviced 
by publicly funded or private intermediaries9. Two further contemporary observations 
are relevant. Many countries are unwilling to invest significant public resources in 
consumer bankruptcy systems, posing the question of how to finance low income 
bankruptcy,  and there is a tendency therefore towards increased routinization of  
processing of individual bankruptcy cases. 
        Against this background, this  article focuses  on one jurisdictionÕs  response to 
the issue of the NINA debtor, the English Debt Relief Order (DRO),  a low-cost, 
means-tested,  administrative procedure only accessible online.  Introduced in 2009, 
its objectives are to  provide access to debt relief and financial inclusion for those 
unable to pay for bankruptcy and for whom bankruptcy might be a disproportionate 
remedy.10 It is delivered through a partnership between the English Insolvency 
Service and accredited debt advice agencies. The term Debt Relief Order rather than 
bankruptcy was intended to reduce the stigma associated with bankruptcy, 
encouraging those in irretrievable distress to seek a remedy. The media dubbed it 
'bankruptcy light'11 and it is now the most frequently used Ôstraight bankruptcyÕ 
remedy (see Figure 1). The idea for a DRO  originated with a New Zealand proposal 
for a 'No Asset Procedure' for consumer debtors in the early 2000s.12 Ireland13 











11 See e.g. James Andrews, 'Bankruptcy light soars Ð and it could get a lot worse: How to 
beat bad debtÕ Daily Mirror 29 April 2016; Daily Mail,  'Bankruptcy light' orders up 40% as 
graduates battle to find jobs and pay off debts' 
12 See  New  Zealand Ministry of Economic Development, No Asset Procedure Paper  
(Wellington, Ministry of Economic Development, 2002) 3, discussed in T Telfer, ÔNew 
Zealand Bankruptcy Law Reform: The New Role of the Official Assignee and the Prospects 
for a No-Asset RegimeÕ in Niemi, Ramsay and Whitford ch 12. 263-267. See also T Keeper,  
ÔNew ZealandÕs No Asset Procedure: A Fresh Start at No Cost? (2014) 14 QUT L Rev 79 
13 Personal Insolvency Act 2012 (as amended) Part 3 Chapter 1. Scotland introduced a ÔLow 
Income Low AssetÓ bankruptcy procedure in 2007, subsequently replacing  it with a ÒMinimal 
AssetÓ procedure in 2015. See now Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 2016 s 2(2) and Schedule 1. 
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procedure has been transplanted to  emerging and developing economies including 
Kenya14, India15 and South Africa.16   In contrast, no such procedure exists in several  
European countries such as Germany and Sweden, where a mandatory repayment 
plan  of several years remains a condition of discharge,  notwithstanding the fact that 
many individuals have no repayment capacity.  
         A central finding of this article is that although the DRO promised bankruptcy 
simplification it has in fact resulted in a more complex access procedure than 
bankruptcy. This occurred because of  the relatively restrictive means test, liability 
limits and other overinclusive access controls, which increased significantly 
processing costs.  The intermediary debt advice agencies, rather than the Insolvency 
Service or debtors, bear many of these costs which are in turn spread among the 
public and private sources of debt advice funding in England and Wales17. This 
English solution for the NINA reflected  partly the influential role of  the relevant 
government departments in the establishment of the scheme for whom the 
introduction of the DRO solved problems which they faced in addressing debt cases. 
Civil servants played a central role in reform, setting the agenda, framing the policy 
options and drafting the legislation.  This story suggests that although the idea of 
bankruptcy simplification might be widely accepted internationally, any actual 
procedure will reflect the politics and institutional history of particular jurisdictions. 
                                                      
14 See Kenya, Insolvency Act 2015 ss343 and following. Section 345 sets out the means 
tested procedure in s345. In South Africa see National Credit Amendment Bill, 2018. 
15 See the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 Chapter II Fresh Start Process. Reports 
leading up to reform had identified the DRO as a useful model:  Ò[T]he innovative 
amendment of the DRO in the UK is a process of quick settlement between debtorÉ and 
creditors leading to automatic discharge in a year without the label of insolvent attaching to 
the debtor. A DRO kind of a mechanism will be very useful in the Indian context considering 
the large number of poor debtors who could benefit from it.Ó S Ramann, R Sane & S 
Thomas, ÔReforming personal insolvency law in IndiaÕ 20. 
(Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, December 2015) 
https://ifrogs.org/PDF/WP-2015-035.pdf  For a general background to the Indian reforms see 
A Feibelman, ÔAnticipating the Function and Impact IndiaÕs New Personal Insolvency 







This article contributes therefore to understanding why particular institutional 
frameworks for individual bankruptcy emerge and change.18  
         Part 2 outlines briefly the DRO process. Part 3 analyzes  the legislative 
background  of the Order as a response to problems faced by the Ministry of Justice, 
responsible for the courts in England and Wales, and the Insolvency Service, the 
English executive agency responsible for administering the vast majority of individual 
bankrupts. These institutions played important roles in setting the agenda and 
framing the issues for reform, against the background of UK  Treasury requirements 
that the Insolvency Service  should cover its costs. This part describes the 
arguments marshalled for the DRO as a  Ôbankruptcy lightÕ remedy which framed the 
policy process and discusses why the DRO developed its particular institutional form.  
Part 4 discusses  briefly  experience with the Order and contrasts it with existing 
bankruptcy practice in England and Wales. This suggests  that the arguments for the 
DRO as an alternative Ôbankruptcy lightÕ remedy are not convincing, and that the 
DRO represents a more rigorous process of scrutiny than bankruptcy for many 
debtors. Part 5 provides  brief comparative perspectives on bankruptcy simplification, 
comparing the  relevance of the English experience for US proposals for a simplified 
administrative bankruptcy, and suggests a future comparative research agenda. 
2. Outline of the DRO process 
A debtor19 must make  an online application  to the Insolvency Service through a 
limited number of  intermediaries accredited by competent authorities20 (See Table 
1).  These are Debt Advice Agencies  whose work is  funded through a combination 
of fair share financing21, a debt advice levy imposed on creditors by the Financial 
Conduct Authority22, and public or charitable funding.23 These agencies  act as 
                                                      
18 Existing explanations include the influence of interest groups, legal origins, or the 
influence of ideas See discussion in I Ramsay, above n2, 11. 
19 The process is only available to individual debtors and creditors may not initiate the 
process. 
20  See Debt Relief Orders (Designation of Competent Authorities) Regulations 
2009.Citizens Advice is the major intermediary (See Table 1). See discussion below, 
section3,  4.1 of its role. 
21  Stepchange represents this model. 
22   Specialist Debt Advice is funded through a levy on creditors by the Financial Conduct 
Authority. The levy is related to the amount of credit extended.  See CP17/38: Regulatory 
fees and levies: policy proposals for 2018/19, The current levy is £48million. This money is 
disbursed through  the Money Advice Service, established under the Financial Services and 
  7 
screening agencies checking the eligibility of the debtor using credit reference 
data24.  Debtor access is limited to individuals with non-exempt assets below 
£100025,  a vehicle valued at less than £1000,  unsecured debts less than £20,000, 
and no more than £50 in surplus income, determined by reference to the reasonable 
domestic needs of the individual and her family, which is in practice determined by 
the  "common financial statement".26   
        Individuals must pay £90 for access to the DRO with £10 going to the approved 
intermediary. The bankruptcy access fee is £680. The DRO  fee may be paid in 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Markets Act 2000 which since amendments  in 2012 is responsible for co-ordinating debt 
advice in England and Wales. See Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (as amended) 
s3S. See https://www.moneyadviceservice.org.uk/en/corporate/money-advice-service-and-
funding-of-debt-advice-services  
23 Local authorities, for example, may  fund specialist debt advice provided by Citizens 
Advice. One intermediary, Christians against Poverty, is financed through donations which 








24  The three main credit reference agencies, Experian, Equifax and CallCredit provides  free 
access to data for approved intermediaries. The formal checks are found in Insolvency 
Rules 5A.7.Ñ Prescribed verification checks Ñ conditions in paragraphs 1 to 8 of Schedule 
4ZA 
25Insolvency Rules 1986/1925 Part 1 Preliminary 5A.10.Ñ Particular descriptions of property 
to be excluded for the purpose of determining the value of a person's property 
26  The  Schedule defines Òmonthly surplus incomeÓ as Ôthe amount by which a person's 
monthly income exceeds the amount necessary for the reasonable domestic needs of 
himself and his familyÕ. Sch 4Z (2) This is generally calculated  using the Common Financial 
Statement (now known as the Standard Financial Statement).The Common Financial 
Statement was first developed by the Money Advice Trust (a debt charity) and the British 
Bankers Association in November 2002 for debt management plans. The Bankers 
Association agreed that if a debtorÕs expenditure was within the guidelines of the statement 
they would accept the plan.  Scotland has conferred statutory force on its use as the 
exclusive tool for determining surplus income.  It does not have statutory force in England 
and Wales but The Money Advice Service has co-ordinated an agreement with a wide 
variety of groups on the use of the statement and Òit is intended that the SFS will become the 
only format used by the debt advice sector, replacing the many alternative financial 
statements currently in use.Ó https://sfs.moneyadviceservice.org.uk/en/what-is-the-standard-
financial-statement  
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instalments, but it must be paid before accessing the procedure.27 Access to a DRO 
is barred to individuals who have entered into a transaction at an undervalue or 
given a preference within the previous two years,28 and  debtor  behavior may be 
sanctioned through a  Debt Restriction Order.29 Creditors can oppose the making of 
an order.  A  debtor must inform the Insolvency service of any change in her financial 
status (e.g. increase in income) during the one-year period.30  This may result in the 
Order being revoked. The use of the term ÒDebt ReliefÓ rather than bankruptcy is 
intended to avoid the stigma of bankruptcy which might deter some applicants.31 The 
order can only be accessed every six years.  
3. The  Legislative Background to  the English DRO 
        The growth of consumer overindebtedness during the 1980s and 90s raised the 
question of the appropriate forms of debt relief for the consumer debtor. Government 
committees had proposed that the central form of relief for consumer debtors should 
be a revised administration order, a court administered remedy originally introduced 
in 1883. Under the proposals, a debtor would make a partial repayment over a 
period of three years with a write off of any residual debt after this period .32 This 
                                                      
27 Contrast therefore with e.g. the Canadian summary procedure where individuals can pay 
the fees in instalments during the nine-month discharge period and if necessary for another 
12 months after discharge. 
28 S 251 (c) (5) Part 1 Schedule 4ZC 9,10. The explanatory notes  indicate that the rationale 
for this prohibition is Ôto avoid a situation where the debtor has disposed of his assets in 
order to meet the permitted criterion for obtaining a debt relief order and to protect the 
position of creditorsÕ 
29  A restriction order may be made either through the court or an undertaking by the debtor 
to the Insolvency Service. It will continue the bankruptcy restrictions on a debtor such as the 
requirement that an individual must declare her status if making an application for a loan, as 
well as statutory disabilities attached to bankruptcy.  A broad discretion exists to make such 
an order where it is appropriate structured by a list of factors such as Ôincurring, before the 
date of the determination of the application for the debt relief order, a debt which the debtor 
had no reasonable expectation of being able to payÕ See Schedule 4ZB (2)(h). 
30 S251J (5).  
31 A 2004 research paper on administration orders found that Ôsome of the people we 
interviewed were very resistant to the idea of bankruptcy, and were deterred by the stigma 
they would face given the relatively small sums of money they owedÉA simplified debt 
procedure would therefore seem more appropriate for people on very low incomes that are 
unlikely to increase. This could be called something other than bankruptcy, to overcome the 
stigma that people feel and differentiate it from the full bankruptcy procedure.  E Kempson & 
S Collard Managing Multiple Debts: Experiences of County Court Administration Orders 
among Debtors, Creditors and Advisors  DCA Research Series 1/04, 76 (2004). 
32 See Ramsay n2, 81-84. 
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proposal, although enacted by Parliament in 1990,33 was never implemented by the 
relevant government department, the Ministry of Justice (then the Lord ChancellorÕs 
Department), partly through fear of increased court costs. During the 1990s 
consumer bankruptcies increased substantially notwithstanding the significant 
upfront fee to access bankruptcy. In 2002, the New Labour government reduced the 
bankruptcy discharge period from three years to one year as part of a policy to 
promote entrepreneurialism. During the parliamentary debates MPs,  briefed by 
Citizens Advice,34 had pressed unsuccessfully for the removal of the fee for 
individuals with limited means35. The bankruptcy deposit fee had also been 
                                                      
33 See s13 Courts and Legal Services Act 1990. 
34 Citizens Advice was established during the second world war to assist citizens with 
gaining knowledge of their rights. It became in the 1960s and 70s a significant source of 
consumer advice and is now a primary source of legal advice to consumers on modest 
incomes and represents the largest independent network of free advice centres in Europe.  
Citizens Advice is a national charity which is funded by a number of government 
departments with a core grant and grants for specific purposes, such as money advice. Its 
services are delivered through approximately 600 sites by 300 independent local bureaux, 
independent charities funded through local authorities, charitable donations and grants from 
CA. The national central office provides expertise but trained volunteers comprise the largest 
percentage of workers in the local bureaux.   Its website indicates that Ôof the 28,500 people 
who work for the service, over 22,000 of them are volunteers and nearly 6,500 are paid 
staff.Õ  The top five issues for advice are social benefits and tax credits, debt, consumer, 
housing and employment.   
            Citizens Advice performs a dual advice and campaigning role. The 2015-16 Annual 
Report states: ÔWe support people to develop the skills they need to help themselves and we 
use our evidence on the issues that our clients face to bring about policy changes that 
benefit everyone.Ó  For a recent overview see S Kirwan, M McDermot and J Clarke, 
ÔImagining and practising citizenship in austere times: the work of Citizens AdviceÕ (2016) 20 
Citizenship Studies 764-778.   
       Collections of individual case studies feed into its campaigning and policy role.  This 
knowledge-acquisition role has led Jones to characterize it as part of a Ôshadow stateÕ which 
assists citizens to learn about their rights but also contributes to a knowledge acquisition 
process by the state about the impact of its policies. R Jones, ÔLearning Beyond the State: 
the pedagogical spaces of the CAB serviceÓ (2011) 14(6) Citizenship Studies 725. Jones 
refers to the following definition of the shadow state by Wolch (1990) The shadow state: 
government and voluntary sector in transition New York, the Foundation Center xvi Ôpara-
state apparatus comprised of multiple voluntary sector organizations, administered outside 
of traditional democratic politics and charged with major collective service responsibilities 
previously shouldered by the public sector, yet remaining within the purview of state control.Ó  
35  See Citizens Advice, Insolvency: A Second Chance: A Response by the CAB Service to 
the Insolvency Services White Paper 13/11/2001; Opposition members briefed by Citizens 
Advice raised the issue of fees during the Parliamentary passage of the Bill. See e.g. J 
Walley MP ÔCitizens Advice Bureaus have already circulated their concerns to many 
members of Parliament. They are concerned about whether those on means tested benefits 
and in hardship will be exempt from the bankruptcy deposit feeÉMany of our constituents 
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challenged unsuccessfully in a test case  as a contravention of human rights law.36 
The court concluded that that no fundamental human right of access to the courts 
was challenged by a mandatory bankruptcy administration fee. The court did 
however express concern for the plight of an individual denied access to debt relief 
because of cost, but indicated that this was an issue for Parliament. The court was 
signaling, in traditional English judicial fashion, that Ôsomething ought to be doneÕ. 37 
         The New Labour government  had  committed in 1997 to reform the 
administration order. It  also established an ambitious overindebtedness task force in  
200438.  This involved a large number of initiatives by central and local government 
departments to reduce over-indebtedness and provide support for those who 
                                                                                                                                                                        
cannot afford to take advantage of some of the BillÕs proposalsÕ. HC Parl Deb Second 
Reading Enterprise Bill Col 69. 
36 Specifically, a common law right to access to courts and article 6(1) of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. See R v. Lord 
Chancellor ex parte Lightfoot [2000] QB 597.  This case was brought by the Public Law 
Project, with support and information provided by the Money Advice Association, the Law 
Centres Federation, the Federation of Independent Advice Centres and the National 
Association of Citizens' Advice Bureaux. The debtor in this case was a casualty of the 
economic recession of the early 1990s, and had also experienced marriage breakdown. Her 
primary debt was the negative equity of £40,000 owing to the mortgagee. The European 
Court of Human Rights rejected an appeal from this decision.  
         Simon Brown LJ in the Court of Appeal did note that Ôthe appellant, Mrs Lightfoot, is 
unable to pay this deposit. She has debts of nearly £60,000 and no significant assets. She 
simply cannot raise the money. Nor is she alone in this predicament. Rather it appears that 
large numbers of debtors are similarly placed. It is, indeed, apparently for this reason that 
the great majority of those wishing to petition for bankruptcy do not in fact do so. To them, 
therefore, is denied what Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle in In re Smith (A Bankrupt); Ex parte 
Braintree District Council [1990] 2 A.C. 215, 237 called "the importance of the rehabilitation 
of the individual insolvent." They face instead a lifetime of unrelieved indebtedness.Õ Ibid 
617. 
 
37 Simon Brown LJ concluded that Ô[I]t is not difficult to recognise the hardship and worry that 
many will suffer through their financial exclusion from the undoubted benefits of this 
rehabilitation scheme and, in the more compassionate times in which we now live, it may be 
hoped that the competing interests will be considered anew and perhaps a fresh balance 
struck.Ó Ibid 631. Chadwick LJ commented that ÔIf that consequence is now thought 
unacceptable, it is for Parliament to alter the law or for the Lord Chancellor, as the rule-
making body, to make an amendment to the rules. It is not for the court to give effect to 
whatever view it might hold as to the appropriate social policy in this field under the guise of 
discovering some hitherto unrecognised fundamental constitutional right.Õ Ibid at 635. 
 
38  See the subsequent interdepartmental strategy paper, ÔTackling OverindebtednessÕ (DTI, 




became overindebted.39 Several initiatives were promised in this document under 
the category ÒThe Justice System and DebtÓ. Government departments and their civil 
servants play a significant role in the development of English bankruptcy law40 and   
personal insolvency engages two Ministries, the Ministry of Justice41, responsible for 
court administration and the then Department of Trade and Industry42, within which 
sits the executive agency, the Insolvency Service.43 Understanding the priorities of 
the two Ministries  explains the particular approach, and framing of reform,  and the 
structure of the DRO procedure. 
      A  research report commissioned by the Ministry of Justice  in 2004 painted a 
picture of a failing administration  order in the county court with high levels of default 
in repayment, and  inconsistent application of the possibility of composition. Users of 
the order were primarily female lone parents, 70 percent of whom were unemployed 
44. The Ministry of Justice (then Department of Constitutional Affairs)  proposed 
therefore  the introduction of a NINA process45 as part of the  solution to the problem 
of the administration order in the county court and the prohibitive costs of a 
bankruptcy petition for low income debtors.46  The DRO represented an alternative 





40 See for example the discussion of earlier English reforms by Halliday and Carruthers in T 
Halliday & B Carruthers,  Rescuing Business:The Making of Corporate Bankruptcy Law in 





43 These Ministries are regularly renamed so that the Ministry of Justice succeeded the 
Department of Constitutional Affairs, which succeeded the Lord ChancellorÕs Office. The 
current Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy succeeded the  Department 
of Business Innovation and Skills. 
44    See  E Kempson & S Collard, Managing Multiple Debts: Experiences of County Court 
Administration Orders among Debtors, Creditors and Advisors  (London, Department of 
Constitutional Affairs, 2004) discussed in Ramsay n 2,85. 
45 See Department of Constitutional Affairs, ÔA Choice of Paths: Better Options to manage 
over-indebtedness  CP23/04 para 35 ÔThe Government is therefore developing a ÔNo income 
No assets debt relief schemeÕ (NINA) which would be administered by the Insolvency 
Service to provide debt relief to the canÕt pay group.Õ 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20040722013541/http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/d
ebt/debt.pdf  
46 Ibid para 32. 
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foreseeable future (especially those on long term low-income)Õ 47. The introduction of 
the NINA would divert a proportion of administration cases from the courts to the 
new  procedure and also some  bankruptcy cases, currently processed through the 
courts.48 The Ministry  rejected administration of  the NINA procedure through the 
courts since this would be costly and fell outside the central role of the courts in 
dispute settlement49.  Ministry of Justice officials had picked up the idea of the Debt 
Relief Order from proposals for a  ÔNo-AssetÕ procedure in New Zealand  designed 
for 'consumer debtors'  whom it was assumed would have few assets and limited 
repayment capacity. 
         The summary of responses to the NINA consultation  by the Ministry of Justice 
paper indicated that some consultees preferred the abolition of the bankruptcy 
deposit to the creation of a NINA procedure. However the Ministry simply responded 
that it was not convinced of the option of waiving the petition deposit, concluded that 
there was broad support for a NINA scheme, and handed over responsibility for its 
development to the Insolvency Service50.  
      The Insolvency Service, an executive agency within the Department of Business, 
processes  and acts as trustee in bankruptcies which are not profitable for the private 
sector. It has done so since its creation in 1883.  These cases now represent 
approximately 80-90 percent of individual bankruptcies, with a small percentage of  
individual small business bankruptcies handled by the private sector.51 The 
                                                      
47 Ibid para 22. The subsequent Insolvency Service consultation indicated that ÔThe type of 
person at whom the scheme is aimed cannot pay even a portion of their debt within a 
reasonable timeframe. Such people are often living on very low incomes, and whilst at the 
time they borrowed the money 
they had every intention of paying it back, they simply lack the means to do so.ÕThe  
Insolvency Service, ÔRelief for the Indebted: An Alternative to Bankruptcy (2005) 4. 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20080610165612/http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/in
solvencyprofessionandlegislation/con_doc_register/consultationpaperwithnewannex1.pdf  
48  The Legislative Impact Analysis estimated that 14% of individuals currently presenting 
their own bankruptcy petition would be eligible for relief under the DRO, thus freeing up court 
time. 
49 ÒChoice of PathsÓ above n 38, para 34. 
50 See the summary of responses at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070101085734/http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/d
ebt/responses.pdf  
51  In 2015 15,845 bankruptcies were processed by the Insolvency Service, 2, 545 by private 
insolvency practitioners. Including DROs with bankruptcies as a form of bankruptcy light, 
private processing accounts for approximately 6% of bankruptcies. Of course, IPs will deal 
with IVAs. Research by R3 (The Insolvency Practitioners Association)   of their members 
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Insolvency Service follows the  new public management model where government 
agencies operate along business lines and on  a cost-recovery basis in relation to 
the processing of bankruptcies.52 Since the great majority of bankruptcy cases have 
no assets this is increasingly not a sustainable funding model.53 A continuing 
challenge has been to reduce the costs associated with processing small 
bankruptcies which offer no dividend. During the 1990s the Service developed a 
summary process which involved  a  relatively light- touch investigation of the 
majority of bankrupts,  and a  bankruptcy discharge after two rather than three years. 
           The introduction of the Debt Relief Order would not necessarily  reduce the 
costs of the Insolvency Service if it were required to determine and check eligibility of 
debtors for the process.  The Service proposed therefore the assistance of debt 
advice agencies54 as competent authorities in processing the online applications. 
Debt advice agencies would benefit, it was argued, from the existence of the Debt 
Relief Order through  a reduction in  the need for continuing negotiations with 
creditors to write off debts or make token payments. They would be able to close the 
file.55  
                                                                                                                                                                        
suggested that the average insolvency handled by a private practitioner involves unsecured 
debt of £109780 and assets of £43,590; the bankrupt is usually self-employed with an 
average estimated income of £28,080.  See R 3 ÔClosing the GapÕ 
https://www.r3.org.uk/media/R3_Gender__Insolvency_June_2016.pdf  
52 See Financial Memorandum between the DBIS and the Insolvency Service, 2004. The 
Service finances its bankruptcy processing  costs from fee income:  investigation and 
enforcement and redundancy payment recovery are funded from government grants and 
successful litigation.   
53 See discussion in  House of Commons Business, Innovation and Skills 
Committee  The Insolvency Service Sixth Report of Session 2012Ð13 Report, together with 
formal minutes, oral and written evidence. (HMSO, London, 2013). 
54  ÔIn order to keep costs to as low a level as possible, we think there would be a  
 need to involve the debt advice sector (which would act as an 
intermediary to assess whether a case is suitable before the debtor applies 
to the official receiver) and for the facility to apply for a debt relief order to 
be available only online.' Above n 47, para 6.  
55 Ibid.  Para 44. "We are aware that intermediaries would need to be properly resourced to 
fulfil this task. We do feel that the availability of a scheme such as that which is proposed 
should, overall, represent a time saving for debt advisers. In cases at present where the 
debtor has nothing to offer his creditors, debt advisers spend large amounts of time 
negotiating and attempting to persuade creditors that the debt should be written off. They 
also devote time to assisting debtors to apply for grants in order to petition for bankruptcy 
and then assisting with queries arising out of any proceedings that ensue. The proposed 
scheme would remove the need for much of this work, but we recognise that the availability 
of a new form of debt relief may, at least in the short term, result in an increased workload 
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       Several themes appear in the consultation56, the subsequent working group on 
the DRO57 and  the legislative impact analysis of the  Debt Relief Order in the 
omnibus Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Bill 2007. First, the idea of the approved 
intermediary, intended to make the system more accessible and efficient,  received 
broad support from both creditors, intermediaries and the debt advice sector, 
although the latter raised concerns about funding the process and ensuring their 
independence. The approved intermediary was viewed as crucial to  the success 
and legitimacy of the process, although the New Zealand model did not incorporate 
this aspect.  Second, a majority favoured a moderate fee for the process although 
some debt advisors demurred arguing that since the scheme was aimed at those 
with no income or assets it was 'nonsensical' to require a fee.58 The government did 
not really engage with the argument that  the process might be funded by a creditor 
levy or through general taxation. The Insolvency Service was clear that the process 
must be self-funding. The Legislative Impact analysis  for the Tribunals Courts and 
Enforcement Act also rejected the alternative of waiving the fees for bankruptcy 
arguing that  bankruptcy was  a disproportionate remedy for this group of debtors, 
                                                                                                                                                                        
for debt advisers while they become accustomed to the procedure and while clients who 
might not previously have sought advice seek a resolution to their problems."  
        The Service then refers to how advisors view the setting up of an administration order 
as a method of effectively closing a case Ôonce an order has been set up a case can be 
effectively closed. In contrast, other multiple debt cases involve negotiations with a number 
of creditors and can remain open for a year or moreÕ.  
56 The consultation received  70 responses. They included creditors, including public 
creditors, and their trade associations (such as the Finance and Leasing Association), debt 
advisers, and professional intermediaries such as PWC.  The idea of the approved 
intermediary received overwhelming support (50 in favour, two opposed) with a general view 
that it would make the system easier to function and would provide Ôuseful face-to-face 
contactÕ. But the debt advice agencies demonstrated two concerns: a possible loss of 
independence,  and the need  for extra resources required for processing DROs. The 
Insolvency Service,  'Relief for the Indebted---an alternative to bankruptcy. Summary of 
Responses and Government Reply' (November, 2005) 16-17 
57  The Working Group consisted of Citizens Advice Bureaux, Institute of Money Advisers, 
Advice Services Commission, National Debtline/Money Advice Trust, Advice UK, CCCS 
(now Stepchange) and the Legal Services Commission. A summary of the intermediary 
working group discussions can be found at the following page of the webarchive of the 
Insolvency Service  
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090903115335/http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/i
nsolvencyprofessionandlegislation/DebtRelief.htm>  The working group concluded that "IMs 
are required to enable the DRO process. Without the IMs, there would be no link between 
the applying debtor and the INSS, and hence the system would not be workable.'  
58 Above n 45,11. 
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that  it would be unfair for other creditors to cross-subsidise these cases, and 
ÒinappropriateÓ that it should be met out of general taxation.59 A recurring theme was 
that although the DRO would impose costs on the Debt Advice sector, this would be 
offset by a reduction in the need for continued correspondence with creditors, and 
agencies would be able to provide debtors with access to a new remedy. 
            In summary, the Debt Advice sector had lobbied for abolition of the 
bankruptcy fee for low income debtors. The response of the DRO drew its initial 
inspiration from a transplant from a foreign jurisdiction but  the agenda of reform and 
the consequent  structure and financing were driven by the interests of the Ministry 
of Justice and the Insolvency Service in removing debt administration from the courts 
and reducing the costs of the Service to ensure that it met the Treasury imperative of 
cost-recovery. The framing of the debate marginalized the possibility of abolition of 
the bankruptcy fee. The reduction in Insolvency Service costs could only be 
achieved by convincing the debt advice sector to play a ÔpartnershipÕ60   role in the 
process. Embedding the debt advice agencies in the process  might  also justify 
further government  funding for debt advice, a continuing concern in an era of 
austerity61.   
         Creditors could be reassured that given the Ôrobust entry criteriaÕ62  to the 
process (screening by approved debt advisers, preferences barring access, once 
                                                      
59 Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Bill: Regulatory Impact Assessment at 90  available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20081106064111/http://www.dca.gov.uk//risk/tce_
bill.pdf . This repeated the earlier statement by the Insolvency Service in the 2005 
Consultation. Above n 47, para 7. 
60 See Intermediary Guidance Notes, DRO2, 3.  The Insolvency Service Guidance Notes 
describe the intermediary as an ÔagentÕ between the debtor and the Insolvency Service, 
playing a Ôpivotal positionÕ in the process.  Citizens Advice indicate that their role within the 
DRO should not compromise its  partnership agreement with Government  that it  Ôwill 
always act independently and in the best interests of our clients, and not as an agent of 
governmentÕ .    
61 The Insolvency Service argued in the Working Group  that the statutory requirement to 
consult debt advisors could benefit the sector and  in addition 'may help safeguard existing 
funding (perhaps even encouraging more). One debt advisor on the working group did 
recognize that it would confer a larger statutory role on debt advice agencies. 
    Kirwan, McDermot and Clarke identify three pressures on the contemporary CABx, the 
increased demands caused by austerity, the pressures on funding, and the reductions in 
legal aid. See generally S Kirwan, M McDermot and J Clarke, (n34).  
62 Legislative Impact Analysis para 5.36. For creditor concerns see e.g.D Atkinson, ÒAlarm at 
ÔquickieÕ bankruptcy plan; debts of up to £15000 could be written off after a year with no 
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every six years, obligation to inform of changes during the one year period, limits on 
the discharge, the possibility of a Debt Restriction Order) individuals would be 
genuine ÔcanÕt paysÕ and  creditors  did not need to continue chasing a debt. The 
intention was to create a simplified procedure, but the ultimate legislation, which 
probably reflected departmental concerns about potential abuse, includes a battery 
of provisions to ensure a proper ÔbalanceÕ is achieved between debt relief and moral 
hazard concerns. Such controls might be justified by a  concern to maintain a 
credible system, as suggested by  Katherine Porter and Ronald Mann in the 
quotation at the beginning of this article. 63 
      Little parliamentary discussion took place concerning  the Debt Relief Order 
provisions during the passage of the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Bill64. Since 
the DRO was part of a larger set of government reforms, it benefited from the 
dominance of the executive in the UK parliamentary system, with little opportunity for 
substantial parliamentary changes. Throughout the development  of the DRO 
evidence of  comparative experience (by the consultees or the Insolvency Service) 
was modest65.  
                                                                                                                                                                        
need for courtÓ Mail on Sunday Nov 28,2006,5ÕÕ; D Atkinson,  ÒDebtors may hide assetsÓ Mail 
on Sunday, March 30,2008,67.  
63 (n6). The City of London Law Society commented on a subsequent consultation on DROs 
that Ô[t]here is clearly a moral hazard risk in making the DRO process available to an 
individual with few or no assets, whatever the size of their debt, as this may simply 
encourage reckless borrowingÕ. City Of London Law Society Insolvency Committee,  
Response to the Insolvency Service call for evidence on Insolvency Proceedings: Review of 
debt relief orders and the bankruptcy petition limit Consultation  
http://www.citysolicitors.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=132   2. 
See also written evidence of the Insolvency Practices Council Memorandum submitted to  
Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Bill, 2007 concerning the DRO ÔWe are concerned that, in  
the absence of adequate verification of debtorsÕ circumstances, the DRO procedure may be 
vulnerable to fraudulent claims.Õ 
64  On second reading in the House of Commons  5 March Col 1318  Mr Heald MP quoted 
NACAB input that Ôin particular, the Debt Relief Order proposals have the potential to help a 
substantial proportion of CAB clients, many of whom are vulnerable and on low incomesÓ. 
See National Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux, Deeper in Debt: The Profile of CAB 
clients  (2006) which indicated that half of their debt clients had less than £20 to offer their 
creditors and on average  Ôit would take CAB debt clients who were able to make a 
repayment to their non-priority creditors 77 years to  
 repay the debts at the amount offeredÓ <16  https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/about-
us/policy/policy-research-topics/debt-and-money-policy-research/deeper-in-debt/>    
65 A brief reference was made to the New Zealand scheme in the 2005 Insolvency Paper 
along with a reference to  the Australian process where the Australian Insolvency Service 
subsidizes personal insolvency law by providing free access where there are no asse
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         The English process suggests the important role of civil servants in the 
Westminster-style  legislative process in framing a reform agenda.  My account 
draws support from Joe SpoonerÕs detailed analysis of the subsequent introduction 
of the DRO procedure in Ireland.66 This took place against the background of the 
bailout  of  Ireland in the wake of the world financial crisis and the collapse of the 
Irish housing market.  He argues that initial proposals  for a relatively debtor friendly 
law were watered down in the Ôquiet politicsÕ67 of departmental framing of detailed 
legislation with the result that relief under the Irish DRO is cabined more restrictively 
than the English procedure68. Although  these Irish changes reflected  the political 
pressure of both creditor interests and the International Financial Institutions, they 
also reflected civil servant influence. The English situation differs from Ireland since 
the DRO was a modification of an existing bankruptcy system rather than the 
introduction of a completely new law, which often induces caution,  and the English 
legislation  was enacted before the financial crisis of 2008.  
4. Implementation of the  DRO   
    The primary  objectives of the NINA process are simplification and cost reduction, 
thus extending access to debt relief. However, its implementation has thrown up 
many legal issues such as the scope of the moratorium69, the scope of excluded 
                                                                                                                                                                        
pay a trustee fee, justified by  the public good from reduction of externalities (such as costs 
to health care, and social security)  from debt. In the early 2000s the Insolvency and Trustee 
Service Australia proposed  to introduce a fee but this was rejected on the basis that the 
Ôpersonal insolvency system provides an overriding general community benefit, not just relief 
for the debtor, so the cost of processing the petitions Éshould be met by taxpayers, not 
individual debtors.Õ See Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia, Cost Recovery Impact 
Statement 17-18 (2005). A fee was introduced in 2014 but was then removed after criticism 
that it impeded access to bankruptcy. See https://www.afsa.gov.au/insolvency/how-we-can-
help/fees-and-charges-0 
66  See J Spooner, ÔThe Quiet-Loud-Quiet Politics of Post-Crisis Consumer Bankruptcy Law 
Reform: the case of Ireland and the TroikaÕ (2018) MLR (forthcoming). 
67  See P Culpepper, Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and 
Japan (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
68  For example,  the Ôonce in a lifetimeÕ approach, a qualified insolvency test (no likelihood of 
becoming solvent within a 3-year period), debtor must not have arranged her financial affairs 
within past 6 months to become eligible for a DRN, three-year moratorium period. 
69 See e.g. R. (on the application of Payne) v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions  
[2011] UKSC 60 (application of moratorium to government attempts to recover overpayment 
of welfare benefits). The  moratorium will not prevent a  landlord evicting the  debtor. See 
Places for People Homes Ltd v. Sharples [2011] EWCA Civ 813 (CA).  See J Spooner, 
ÔSeeking Shelter in Personal Insolvency Law: Recession, Eviction,  and BankruptcyÕs Social 
Safety netÕ (2017) 44 (3) Journal of Law and Society  374. 
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debts70, the nature of Insolvency Service decision making under the DRO,71 the 
construction of  the preference provision72, the application to annual utility or Council 
tax bills which may be paid by instalments,73 and the treatment of amounts received 
by the debtor during the moratorium. The Insolvency Service also issues 
intermediary guidance  and meets  with competent authorities  on a regular basis to 
discuss emerging issues.74    
      The government estimated the potential uptake for the DRO as 43,000 after two 
years.75 However only approximately 30,000 individuals used a DRO in 2012 and 
this remains the current level, notwithstanding an increase in qualifying liabilities 
from £15,000 to £20,000 in 2015.76 Women represent almost two-thirds of applicants 
and many are sole parents. The majority are unemployed. They owe debts to central 
and local state creditors  and public utilities as well as private creditors.77  
Comparison of the causes of bankruptcy and DROs (Tables 2,3 ) indicate the higher 
                                                      
70 For example, is a parking charge penalty a  fine  and therefore an excluded debt?  
71  See R(Howard) v. Official Receiver (QBD) [2013] EWHC 1839 (In adjudicating on DRO 
applications is the Official Receiver acting in a  judicial or administrative manner). 
72  See e.g. Islington LBC v. C  [2012] BPIR 363. 
73 See Kaye v South Oxfordshire District Council [2013] EWHC 4165; Severn Trent Water 
Ltd v. Said  (2015, unreported, Coventry County Court). 










77  An early survey by the Insolvency Service noted that the profile of debtors accessing the 
DRO system was primarily low income, predominantly unemployed individuals with an 
average of six creditors; over 53% of debt was owed to banks, building societies and credit 




t%20-FINAL.pdf . More informal data since the recession suggest that public creditors may 
now be more significant. See e.g. A Pardo, J  Lane, P Lane, D Hertzberg, Citizens Advice, 
Unsecured and Insecure ( (2015). This paper argues that over the past five years there has 
been a significant shift in problems Ôaway from mainstream credit issues towards problems 
with arrears on council tax, rent and energy bills. Five years ago, credit cards were the main 
debt issue we saw. Now council tax arrears top the list.Õ  
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percentage of illness/accidents as a primary cause for DROs, and the dominance of 
factors such as significant reduction in income and increase in expense.  
          No comprehensive evaluation of the DRO programme has been undertaken, 
notwithstanding government promises to do so,  but  a government review in 2015 
which collected input from intermediaries, concluded that the Ôthe DRO competent 
authority and intermediary model is working well andÉDROs have a very significant 
impact on the wellbeing of debtors.Õ78 Feedback from clients of the approved 
intermediaries indicate that the DRO had  the immediate effect of improving their 
mental and physical health,  family relationships and reduced stress.79  However, 
little evidence exists concerning the economic and financial long term impact of a 
DRO.80   
4.1. The central role of  intermediaries in the DRO ÔpartnershipÕ. 
         The  Insolvency Service is the decision-making body for DROs81 but  devotes 
modest resources to the DRO and covers its costs through the user fee82.  It does 
not actively monitor debtors during the moratorium period.   
         The system relies heavily on the intermediaries.  Citizens Advice, the dominant 
intermediary,  operates a specialist unit for processing Debt Relief Orders83,  in  
                                                      
78 See Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, ÔInsolvency Proceedings: Debt Relief 




79  National Debtline survey of 30 clients who had completed the moratorium period within 
the last 6 months. See Money Advice Trust, ÔInsolvency ServiceÑDROs & the Bankruptcy 
Petition LimitÕ (2014). 
80 Citizens Advice provide one example of an individual  stressed by debt who was able to 
come off benefits move back into work and be promoted. See Citizens Advice, ÒResponse to 
the Insolvency Service, ÔDebt Relief Orders and the Bankruptcy Petition Limit: Call for 
EvidenceÕÓ(2014). The Intermediary Christians against Poverty conducted a study of their 
clients which suggested that the DRO had been successful. See  CAP, The Freedom Report 
(2017) https://capuk.org/downloads/policy_and_government/the_freedom_report.pdf The 
study had an 18% response rate. 
81 The Act makes it the decision-making body but also contains several presumptions which 
require the Service to assume the correctness of an application if it appears so on the 
record. See Insolvency Act 1986 s251C-D. See discussion of the judicial role of the 
Insolvency Service in DROs in Regina (Howard) v. Official Receiver [2013] EWHC 1839 
(admin). 
82   See Insolvency Service Annual Report and Accounts 2015-16, Financial Statements 6  
(HC 482) which indicates a surplus of £415,000 in 2015-16. The Insolvency Service has a 
single division at Plymouth which administers DROs. 
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addition to processing cases through local bureaux,  and introduced a central unit 
which provides expert legal  advice to local bureaux in complex cases84. This latter 
unit meets with the Insolvency Service periodically to discuss current legal issues  
concerning the interpretation of  DRO provisions, and the intermediary guidance.  
Both  units are funded by the creditor levy distributed through the Money Advice 
Service. Citizens Advice has also  initiated test cases on the interpretation of the 
DRO.  
         The DRO promised cost savings for debt advisors but the major intermediaries 
in a review in 2014 indicate that the fee does not cover the costs of processing 
DROs.  Step Change (funded through the fair share model)  argued that Ôthe current 
£10 payment to competent authorities for each DRO is nowhere close to the actual 
cost of advising on and processing a DRO application. This funding situation is not 
sustainable in the long termÉÕ85 Citizens Advice was more muted  noting simply that 
Ôthe income generated via DRO application fees does not fully cover the costs of 
providing the competent authority role.Õ86 A recent inquiry claims that the average 
cost of processing a DRO is £300.87  My preliminary research suggests that  
processing a DRO takes up significant time and costs for intermediaries because of 
the need to check credit reference data88, ensure that all debts  and assets are 
included and stated correctly,89 and do not exceed the relevant ceilings. Possible 
preferences must be identified. Issues with rent arrears may require attention. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
83  Established in 2014, this includes about 17 approved intermediaries who take references 
from local CABx throughout England and Wales. 
84  This service is now operated by Shelter, the primary housing charity in the UK. See 
https://www.nhas.org.uk/news/article/shelter‐to‐offer‐specialist‐debt‐advice‐service  
85 Indicating a  shortfall of £890,000 in the annual costs of processing DROs.  Response by 
Step Change Debt Charity to the Insolvency Service Consultation Paper: Insolvency 
Proceedings: Debt relief orders and the bankruptcy petition limit (2014) 7. 
86 Citizens Advice, 'Debt Relief Orders and the bankruptcy petition limit: Call for evidence: 
Citizens Advice response to the Insolvency Service, 9. The Money Advice Trust, another 
intermediary financed primarily by creditor contributions, pointed to the high costs of 
ensuring a debtor qualified for the DRO but noted  that it Ôprovides reassurance for creditors. 
They can be confident that applying for a DRO is not an easy optionÕ. Money Advice Trust at 
13. 
87 See P Wyman,  'Independent Review of the Funding of Debt Advice in England, Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland' (2018) 26. The basis for this calculation is not clear.  
88 This may still be done by post rather than online. 
89  Thus, if an outstanding balance is stated as £500 but is in fact £600, only £500 will be 
written off. 
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Significant numbers of individuals applying for a DRO may be in vulnerable 
situations and require face-to-face advice in the DRO approval process90. Whether 
these short-term costs  for intermediaries are being outweighed by savings in the 
long-term costs of continuing negotiations with creditors has not been tested. The 
DRO permitted the government to retain the integrity of its cost-recovery model, an 
imperative of central government, while passing on much of the costs to agencies 
which are funded through a mixture of public funds and creditor levies.  
        Screening by a limited number of approved intermediaries does ensure that 
only qualified debtors apply since almost no applications are rejected by the 
Insolvency Service.91 It may heighten the legitimacy of the system and reduce calls 
to introduce other controls.  This English model contrasts with New Zealand where 
the absence of screening agencies results in a high percentage of rejected 
applications by the state Insolvency Trustee service (see Table 4).92 Few DROs are 
revoked (0.9%) under the Insolvency Service's discretionary power.93 The Insolvency 
Service guidance indicates that revocation is unlikely where small increases occur to 
a debtor's income.94  
        Limiting access through approved intermediaries  may however increase 
access costs. An advisor who is not an approved intermediary may have to refer an 
individual to another agency,  and the profit-making debt management sector  lacks 
incentives to promote this alternative. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that the 




91 Data  provided to me by the Insolvency Service indicate that about 1% of applications are 
rejected  by the Insolvency Service with further information requested in about 5 percent of 
cases.  
92 See Ministry of Economic Development, (n0) 47 which indicates that the  primary reasons 
for the high levels of rejection are incomplete applications, debts higher than the statutory 
ceiling and objections by creditors. 
93 Data provided by Insolvency Service. See  Insolvency Act s 251 L for the various grounds 
under which the Insolvency Service 'may' revoke an order. 
94 "[A]pplicants are clearly required to comply with the legislation, they should not overly 
worry about small increases in income affecting their eligibility. Provided the increase in 
benefits or income does not permanently increase their income such that the parameter is 
breached, no further action will be taken by the Official ReceiverÕ. See Insolvency Service 






   4.2. Comparison  of the DRO process to Bankruptcy. 
         A primary reason for rejecting the policy of a reduced bankruptcy fee for those 
on low incomes was that bankruptcy was a disproportionate remedy. However, a 
comparison of the two procedures suggests that the DRO process may  impose 
more rigorous requirements than bankruptcy.   First, both a DRO and debtor 
applications for bankruptcy are now administrative rather than court based  
procedures and may be completed online. Second, a  DRO can  be applied for  only 
every six years whereas no such restriction applies to bankruptcy.  Third,  
preferential payments are treated differently under DRO provisions.  A preferential 
payment (without any need to demonstrate an intent to prefer)  bars a  DRO 
application, but does not prevent a bankruptcy petition being filed. The official  
rationale for this approach to DROs is to prevent individuals transferring away their 
property and then applying for an order96.  The use of  a bright line rule on 
preferences to achieve this objective  may have been intended to reduce 
administration costs but this  sanction will catch many small fry in its net, where 
individuals may have made some modest payments to family members . In addition 
the courts have indicated that in practice a desire to prefer should be read into the 
section, creating uncertainty in application.97  The preference provision also conflicts 
with the approach of  the major debt advice agencies in  drawing up budgets for 
clients. These  agencies prioritize certain debt repayments for example to landlords 







96  The explanatory notes indicate that the rationale is Ôto avoid a situation where the debtor 
has disposed of his assets in order to meet the permitted criterion for obtaining a debt relief 
order and to protect the position of creditors.Õ 
97  See Islington LBC v C [2012] BPIR 363. In this case, a debtor had prioritised payments to 
a landlord to  clear arrears of rent  and avoid repossession.  District Judge Hart concluded 
that a desire to prefer must  be read into the section, Ò[o]therwise, almost any payment by 
the debtor to a qualifying creditor in the two years prior to the DRO application being 
determined would amount to a preference and rule out the possibility of a DRO being made. 
It is very unlikely that very many DROs could ever be made in the circumstancesÉa 
payment to a landlord is likely to be motivated by a desire to avoid possession proceedings, 
rather than by a desire to better the position of the landlordÓ id 366. 
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subsequent Debt Relief Order.98 Debt advisors criticized the reach of the preference 
provision in the governmental review in 2014.99 The rather clumsy strict preference 
provision seems animated by a fear of moral hazard,  and a concern by government 
policy makers to allay any creditor fears of debtors avoiding repayment.  
       Third,  a DRO releases an individual only   from the qualifying debts listed in the 
order. Bankruptcy releases an individual  from all  bankruptcy debts, defined more 
broadly than debts in a DRO 100. Fourth,  an individual receiving income or property 
during the moratorium period may be subject to the order being revoked.  The 
Insolvency Service exercises a discretion as to revocation.101 Although only a small 
percentage of orders are revoked the possibility of revocation because of an 
increase in income or assets raises the question of whether this reduces incentives 
for individuals to seek employment.  
           Fifth,  a contrast exists between the DRO and bankruptcy  in  the timing and 
nature  of investigation of the debtors conduct. Bankrupts are  subject to 
investigation by the Insolvency Service after they have filed for bankruptcy. In 
practice evidence exists that this may be a relatively light-touch experience for many 
debtors.  In 2012 I noted that two-thirds of bankrupts are interviewed briefly by 
                                                      
98 As in the case above.  The Insolvency Service guidance indicates that 'preference 
transactions are typically (but not restricted to) payments to friends or family members.' They 
provide no authority for this statement. See The Insolvency Service, Intermediary Guidance 
Notes DRO2 (2016) 39. It seems that payments to friends and family are more likely to lead 
to decline of an order rather than payments to priority creditors See CA response to the 
Insolvency Service ÔDebt Relief Orders and the bankruptcy petition: Call for evidenceÕ, 21. 
 
99 The Money Advice TrustÕs submission to the 2014 review claimed that Ôthere are many 
instances where we have had clients who have applied for a DRO but have either been 
declined or have not gone ahead with their application because of issues such as preference 
paymentsÉ.It seems unfair that some clients do not qualify for a DRO as a result of taking 
action (often entirely innocently) such as repaying a family member or friend before repaying 
creditors. We would expect most people would be likely to do the same in a similar situation.Õ 
Money Advice Trust, ÔDROs and the Bankruptcy Petition LimitÕ, 17.  
100 Contingent liabilities are not included, presumably because of the cost of assessing them. 
101 The Insolvency Service Intermediary Guidance indicates at 6 that the 'decision to revoke 
is discretionary and where the value of the property acquired is modest, the Official Receiver 
will not revoke for all cases where the applicant is open and honest and the value of the 
asset in question is less than £1000, provided that the total sum involved does not exceed 
50% of the applicant's total liabilities'. However, if the debtor receives a lumps sum 'which is 
associated with a permanent increase in income, bringing the applicant's surplus income to 
over £50 per month then this will lead to revocation." Ibid 7. 
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phone102 and anecdotal commentary suggests that the actual experience of debtors 
with the Insolvency Service is less draconian than they feared103. In contrast, the 
bulk of investigation of a debtor in a DRO is undertaken  by an approved 
intermediary. The DRO shifts the weight of investigation  to the pre-filing stage and 
advisors will be careful to ensure accuracy since their client risks losing £90 if the 
strict criteria of the DRO are not met. Notwithstanding this pre-filing investigation by 
an approved intermediary an individual must wait a year before discharge. Sixth, a 
debtor's assets do not vest in a trustee in a DRO since  by definition they have few 
assets. However the  majority of  bankrupts also  have  no or limited assets  and a 
very small percentage of bankruptcies are likely to offer a dividend to creditors after 
payment of the OR administration fee. Seventh, the requirement of access to the 
DRO through a limited number of  competent authorities with approved 
intermediaries, may increase access costs for individuals and be one reason for the 
failure of DRO numbers to meet government predictions.  Finally, both bankruptcies 










102 I D C Ramsay, ÔA Tale of Two Debtors: Responding to the Shock of Over-indebtedness in 
France and England-A Story from the Trente Piteuses (202)  75(2) MLR 180, n168. 
103  See e.g. DD Wray, ÔHereÕs what itÕs like to go bankrupt at 30Õ Buzzfeed 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/danieldylanwray/heres-what-its-like-to-file-bankruptcy-at-
30?utm_term=.brvAegVex#.njeB8K389  ÒMy official receiver was great: She was kind and I 
felt she was going out of her way to help me rather than trip me up. The purpose of the 
interview with the official receiver is to work out how and why you got into the situation and 
to work out your current income and outgoings, with the idea that you may be assigned an 
income payment agreement (IPA) to continue to make reduced payments to your creditors 
(the people you owe money to). 
Because I had continued to make all my repayments and had got into debt in a pretty 
traditional and genuine way, it seemed like I was in fairly good shape. The overwhelming 
feeling that soon took hold was that if youÕre not fraudulent and havenÕt simply taken out a 
massive loan, spent it, repaid nothing, and then declared bankruptcy, then youÕre generally 
going to be OK.`Õ 




















         The relevant Ministries argued that bankruptcy was a disproportionate remedy 
for lower income debtors. But in practice this conclusion appears questionable.  
Summary 
    The idea of bankruptcy simplification through an administrative No Income-No 
Asset Procedure is attractive as a method of minimizing the overall social costs of 
overindebtedness.  This brief description of the English approach suggests that the 
actual implementation has resulted in legislation which is not as simple as 
proponents might have expected and represents a screening process at least as 
rigorous as bankruptcy for most debtors. The DRO, a process established for the 
Ôdeserving poorÕ seems to be more stringent than bankruptcy, raising questions 
about equality of access to debt relief.  However, the increased costs of screening 
are  borne  by the Debt Advice sector, and the credit reference agencies, rather than 
the debtor or the Insolvency Service.  Funding of the process is partly underwritten 
financially  by creditors through the creditor levy which finances debt advice, and 
specialist Citizens Advice DRO unit. This role of creditors in funding the DRO  is 
ironic in the light of the opposition to such an approach in the initial consultations on 
the DRO. The DRO is a form of public-private partnership in its delivery. If it is an 
effective system (little research exists on long term effects of the DRO Ôfresh startÕ) it 
is primarily because of the relatively well developed institutional structure of 
bankruptcy administration and debt advice in England and Wales.  
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         The DRO process, although apparently simple, is suffused with law and 
continuing legal issues of interpretation, requiring legal knowledge.  Intermediaries 
play a significant role in processing debtors in this administrative system and in the 
application and development of the legal  provisions. They also provide legitimacy to 
the process. This article is not directed towards reform of the DRO but it could be a 
more effective and less costly remedy if the level of liabilities were substantially 
increased and access barred only where there was likelihood of a significant 
dividend to creditors.105  
Part 5: Comparative Thoughts: administrative justice and US bankruptcy 
simplification 
          In 2003 we highlighted the topic of Ôadministrative versus judicialized systems 
for implementing lawÕ, 106 as a topic in the comparative study of consumer 
bankruptcy.  We suggested  that future comparative research could attempt to 
explain why different systems for implementing consumer bankruptcy  law have 
emerged in different countries, and to  draw judgments about whether an 
administrative or judicialised system is most effective.  Systems of debt relief for 
consumers are increasingly systems of administrative justice107,  but this general 
description masks substantial differences in terms of the role of institutions and 
intermediaries, their origins, objectives and values. The over indebtedness 
commissions in France, composed of representatives of the central and local state, 
creditors and consumers, and managed by the Bank of France, are distinct in origin 
and operation to the Swedish enforcement office (the KFM), originally a tax collection 
agency, and now striving to balance increased productivity with more debt relief.108  
      Future comparative research might compare these systems within distinct 






106  See J Niemi, I Ramsay & W Whitford (eds) Consumer Bankruptcy in Global Perspective 
(Hart, Oxford, 2003) 11. 
107
 World Bank above n4  paras 161, 163. 
108 For a discussion of the development of the French system see Ramsay above n2 ch4 
and for Sweden, ch5, 139. See also B Larsson & B Jacobsson, ÔDiscretion in the ÔBackyard 
of Law: Case Handling of Debt Relief in SwedenÕ (2013) 3(1) Professions and 
Professionalism 1. 
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useful site for research, since many proposals for NINA programmes assume an 
administrative model. Jerry Mashaw, in a study of the US disability entitlement 
programme, identified three models of  administrative justice; bureaucratic rationality, 
professional treatment and moral judgment.109  These ideals responded to different 
critiques of the  US disability systemÑthat it was inconsistent and poorly managed, 
that it failed to serve the client in providing rehabilitation, and that it operated unfairly 
without adequate attention to Ôdue processÕ. These models are not mutually 
exclusive so that any administrative system may contain a combination of aspects of 
these models. MashawÕs model permits analysis of potential trade-offs between 
normative values in an administrative system, and identification of  the influence of 
different groups on a system. The English system of DROs  represents a model of 
bureaucratic rationality, stressing the application of rules, driven by computerization, 
modestly tempered by professional treatment of debtors by the intermediaries.  
       At first sight the US model of consumer bankruptcy administration might not 
seem to fit the description of a system of administrative justice with its assumption of 
state administration, given the central role of courts, and the Ôprimacy [of] lawyers 
rather than administratorsÕ.110 However, commentators recognize that the 
contemporary US system of consumer bankruptcy is in fact an administrative 
system. The Ôoverwhelming majority of consumer bankruptcy cases are non-
adversarial in natureÕ,111 and this has been the case for Ôat  least fifty yearsÕ.112 
Judges  rarely deal with Chapter 7 cases which are processed in a routinized 
manner, often by para-legal staff.  
       The recognition of the administrative nature of US consumer bankruptcy raises 
the question of its relationship to MashawÕs categories. Bureaucratic rationality 
motivated the continuing attempts since the 1930s to introduce  an administrative 
                                                      
109 J. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability Claims (New 
Haven, Yale, 1983) 26 et seq. See an updated and modified model based on Mashaw in M. 




111 Id. 1982. 
112 Littwin, above n 0, 2011 citing data which indicate that even after BAPCPA ÔChapter 7 
remains a non-adversarial process.Õ 
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agency to process consumer bankruptcies  in the US113. In 1970 the National 
Bankruptcy Review Commission adopted the findings of the Brookings Commission 
that much of the  bankruptcy system was in  fact  administrative rather than judicial in 
nature,114 and that Ôthere is no reason to involve judges in handling of papers and 
procedures for many thousands of cases in which no contest arises.Õ115 The 
introduction of a  Federal Bankruptcy Agency could process more swiftly the large 
number of uncontested cases, provide greater uniformity in administration, and offer 
budget and counselling services: debtors would not need legal representation within 
this system, substantially reducing bankruptcy costs.  The idea of budget counselling 
intended to achieve better rehabilitation for debtors introduced an element of 
professional treatment, based on a model of the debtor as poor debt managers.116 
            The story of the political  failure of these initiatives is well known. Bankruptcy 
judges and  lawyers mounted a fierce opposition to the introduction of an 
administrative agency processing bankruptcies, evoking images of a Òdespot stateÓÑ
a Ôhuge bureaucracy  with tentacles reaching into every area of the country and 
marked with all the weaknesses of inept officialism, expensive red tape and 
corruption 117. Creditors also opposed an administrative system fearing  the 
possibility of a bankruptcy explosion. The success of lawyers  in defeating the 
administrative agency concept  represents the continuing  historical  influence of 
legal professionals on bankruptcy policymaking in the US.  David Skeel argues that 
the early role of professional lawyers in  bankruptcy administration in the US resulted 
in  a path dependency, entrenching the role of lawyers and courts, which raised the  
                                                      
113 Littwin, n 2 1981-1986. The Brookings Commission described the administration of 
bankruptcy in 1964 as a Ômultimillion-dollar loosely connected structureÕ  which would benefit 
from greater administrative co-ordinationÕ D Stanley & M Girth, Bankruptcy: Problem, 
Process, Reform  (Washington, DC, Brookings, 1971) 111.   
114 See Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States as 
summarized in (1973-74) 29 Bus Law 75, 88. 




117 Asa Herzog a distinguished bankruptcy judge quoted in E Posner, ÔThe Political Economy 
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (1997) Michigan L Rev 47,78. 
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political costs for subsequent attempts to introduce administrative regulation of 
bankruptcy procedures in the 1930s and the 1960s.118  
             The US is unlikely to adopt a model of public processing of debtors similar to 
England and Wales.  However, this should not blind us to the fact that the US system 
is an administrative system, with the administrative infrastructure provided by 
lawyers, and para-legals,  overseen by both the judiciary and the Federal Trustee 
service which now has extensive powers over the system.119 The US system lacks 
the appearance of a centralized and unified  Ôtop-downÕ government bureaucracy but 
remains a loosely structured  Ôinfrastructural powerÕ, represented by Ôthe  positive 
capacity of the state to Ôpenetrate civil societyÕ and implement policies  throughout a 
given territoryÕ, using private actors (for example Chapter 7 trustees)  to achieve 
public objectives.120 For example, the 2005 amendments to the BAPCPA harness 
the role of lawyers as gatekeepers, imposing penalties if they do not adequately 
monitor information provided by their client. Trends towards bureaucratic rationality 
may be  accelerated by the increasing use of online technology. However, the 
existence of Ôlocal legal cultureÕ121 indicates that the US system does not fit snugly 
into a bureaucratic rationality model. Varying interpretations of appropriate 
professional treatment exist.  Jean BraucherÕs important study of  US consumer 
bankruptcy lawyers demonstrated how lawyersÕ financial interests and social 
                                                      
118 D Skeel, DebtÕs Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America (Princeton, Princeton 
U Press, 2001) 43-47 










121 Ô[S]ystematic and persistent variations in local legal practices as a consequence of a 
complex of perceptions and expectations shared by many practitioners and officials in a 
particular locality and differing in identifiable ways from the practices, perceptions, and 
expectations existing in other localities subject to the same or a similar formal regime.Õ See T 
Sullivan, E Warren & J Westbrook, ÔConsumer Bankruptcy in the United States: A Study of 
Alleged Abuse and of Local Legal CultureÕ (1997) 20 Journal of Consumer Policy 223, 244.  
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attitudes affected their advice and that varied models of client counselling existed122.  
She found that some lawyers played Ôthe role of a helping professional, part teacher, 
part social worker, part financial adviserÕ; some saw their role as a consumer 
advocate.Õ123 
         Intermediaries in this system  might be analogized to Ôstreet level 
bureaucratsÕ124 who have a level of discretion in the implementation of law and 
policy: their interpretation may be  the policy.125 While the concept of the street level 
bureaucrat was coined to describe  intermediaries in public services  addressing 
problems between the individual and the state, it might be extended to consumer 
bankruptcy practice which is often a high volume and routinized procedure.  
          Angela Littwin, recognizing  the  administrative nature of the US bankruptcy 
system,  argues that unlike  other redistributive programmes in the US, such  as the  
ÔKafkaesqueÕ social security administration, consumer bankruptcy administration 
represents  an effective system because of Ôthe existence of the paid bar, strong 
bankruptcy judges and the prestige associated with the corporate barÕ.126  Procedural 
barriers, unmet legal needs and poor quality decision making characterize social 
security administration in the US. In contrast, she argues that bankruptcy 
administration is characterized by high quality decision makers, and the benefits of 
paid professionals.  Lawyers act as consumer advocates, lobbyists for the system,  
and represent a professional corps which sustains the workability of the bankruptcy 
system.127 She points, for example, to the Bankruptcy Rules Committee where 
bankruptcy lawyers and judges ironed out potential problems in the implementation 
of BAPCPA.  
           LittwinÕs arguments concerning US consumer bankruptcy administration 
underline three points for future comparative analysis. First, the institutional structure 
                                                      
122 See J Braucher, ÔLawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many CulturesÕ (1993) 
67 Am Bankr L J 501. 
123  Id  
124  See M Lipsky, Street-level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services. 
(New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 1980).  
125  See S Laws ÔWhat is Owed: Debt: Bankruptcy and American CitizenshipÕ PhD thesis, 
Univ of Minnesota, 2011) suggesting that Chapter 7 trustees might be conceptualized as 
street level bureaucrats. 
126 Littwin (n6)1988. 
127 Id 2009-2022. 
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of consumer bankruptcy is a key aspect in determining the  credibility and legitimacy 
of the system. Second, both the English DRO and US bankruptcy system harness 
civil society actors in bankruptcy administration. Third, intermediaries play a key role 
in both systems.  The English experience suggests that  even with bankruptcy  
simplification, intermediaries make the system work more effectively and ensure its 
credibility.128  Citizens Advice  functions in England and Wales as a lawyer, debt 
advisor, emotional supporter  and processor for clients.129  Debt problems are 
complex  requiring a knowledge of bankruptcy law, consumer law, social security,  
housing law and budgeting.130 Citizens Advice  also acts as a lobbyist for change in  
the interests of debtors using sample cases to develop policy briefs on many topics.  
It participates in discussions on rule development through the intermediary guidance 
process.  It thus appears to  perform similar functions to private lawyers, judges  and 
their organizations in the US.   An empirical study of the  quality of decision making 
by private lawyers and Citizens Advice agencies in relation to debt concluded that 
debt advisers in Citizens Advice were operating at a higher level of quality than 
private lawyers.131 Social support programmes in the UK have also becomes 
stigmatized as residual, means tested institutions with similar stories  of Kafkaesque 
bureaucracies,132 but accessing administrative debt relief  does not seem to be 
viewed in this light by its users who generally praise the role of Citizens Advice and 
the Insolvency Service.  
        These observations suggest the value of further  comparative analysis of 
consumer bankruptcy systems as systems of administrative justice. Comparative 
institutional analysis of the law in action might puncture myths, undermine simple 
comparisons between private and public systems, and heighten understanding.  
CONCLUSION 
                                                      
128 And see comments of Jay Westbrook on the need for lawyers in the US system. J 
Westbrook, ÒThe Retreat of American Bankruptcy LawÓ (2017) 17 QUT LRev. 40, 56. 
129 See e.g. S Kirwan,Ó Advice on the Law but not legal advice so muchÓ: Weaving Law and 
Life into Debt AdviceÓ in S Kirwan (ed) Advising in Austerity: reflections on challenging times 
for advice agenciesÕ (Bristol, Policy Press, 2017) 147-155. 
130 See e.g. the topics covered in Child Poverty Action Group, Debt Advice Handbook (11th 
edition, 2015). 
131 R Moorhead et al, ÔContesting Professionalism: Legal Aid and NonLawyers in England 
and Wales (2003) 37 Law and Society Rev  765, 796  
132 Epitomised in the film I Daniel Blake (2016). 
  32 
This paper outlined the response of one jurisdiction to addressing the issue of the 
NINA or LILA debtor.  The  cautious English approach  increased the costs of the 
process although they were masked by being borne by intermediaries rather than 
debtors. The English approach illustrates Jay WestbrookÕs caveat that although 
bankruptcy simplification is desirable, the moral ambiguity of bankruptcy often 
Ôcauses lawmakers to fill it with exceptions and qualificationsÕ133 leading to greater 
complexity and the consequent need for  trained intermediaries, such as lawyers in 
the US system.  
       Further comparative analysis of the institutional  administration of consumer 
bankruptcies and its financing, should permit more generalization about why 
particular bankruptcy institutions emerge and change, the influence of different 
groups over this structure and the relative role of a variety of intermediaries---
lawyers, accountants, debt advice agenciesÑin ensuring the effectiveness of these 
bankruptcy systems. Existing institutional structures in those countries with 
established bankruptcy systems are likely to have a patterning effect on any future 
reforms to address NINA or LILA debtors. Law reform projects in those  jurisdictions 
which propose to introduce individual bankruptcy laws need also pay close attention 
to the importance of institutional structure in any transplantation of ideas, such as 

















































Table 1:  Main Competent Authorities and approved intermediaries 2013-14 
Competent Authority No of intermediaries No of DRO apps 
Citizens Advice 1337 (72%) 14520 (53%) 
Institute of Money 
Advisers 
287 (16%) 3703(14%) 
National Debtline 12 (1%) 1227 (4%) 
Payplan 12(1%) 269 (1%) 
Stepchange Debt Charity 31(2%) 4962 (18%) 
Christians against 
Poverty 
 7 (0.4) 1097 (4%) 
Other 
 
165 (9%) 1547 (6%) 
Total 1851 27329 
 
 
Table 2: Causes of Bankruptcy as recorded by Official Receiver 2015  
 
 
 Non-Trading Cases 
(n=11095) % 
All cases (n=14905)% 
Business Related Failure -- 25 
Living Beyond Means 19 14 
Relationship Breakdown 16 12 
Loss of Employment 12 9 
Illness/Accident 11 8 
Reduction in household 24 18 
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income 
Speculation 1 1 
Other 17 13 
In 955 cases the cause was recorded as Ôunknown/non-surrenderÕ. These cases are 
not included in the Table. 





































Source: NZ Insolvency and Trustee Service 
https://www.insolvency.govt.nz/support/about/statistics/statistical-data-reports/  
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